El 4/72 

.17 




UBRARY OF CONGRESS 



DDDESD^amD 






LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 



509 341 



Cifiijiiients on 9lMjor-Cieu. Model- 
lan's account ol' his W(>t Vir- 

Toledo, Nov. 2d, 1864. 

To t/ie Hon. Wni. Dennmn, Late Governor of 

Ohio : 

SiK : My apology for presuming fo address 
yon, and for publishing this p;yjer before it 
i»ad been submitted to you, must be tound in 
the facts and circumstances herein referred to. 

I have the honor respectfully to call your 
attention to the U<.ct, that in the ^V inter of 
18G1-2 the President was asked to appoint 
me a Brigadier General of Volunteer.«. • The 
appointnjent was not made. A long time af- 
terwards I was credibly informed tlmt the ob- 
stacle to my appointment lay in the opposi- 
tion covertly manifested by Maj. Gen. jMcClei- 
lan, then occu^.ying a high i)Gsiiiun in the 
army. 

You did me' the .horror to commission 
me a Brigadier in .June, 1861, and ordered me 
to Western Virginia, to comiuand a portion of 
the Ohio three months' troops, then serving 
under Maj. Gen. McClellan. I had sei ved un- 
der him about thirty days before he was or- 
dered to Washingtcjn, and up to the 14th of 
July, 1861, had received from him direct and 
strong commendation with every mark of 
contidence, If I did, or omitted, anything, 
to cause a forfeiture of that confidr^nce, it 
must have been that I did not intercept or 
captuie Garneti's Rebel army, after it had 
eluded and escaped from Generals McClellan 
and Morris. 

General McClellan passed through Grafton, 
Va., on his way to assume command of the 
Army of the Potomac, on the 33d or 24th of 
July. 1861. General Rosecrans accompjinied 
him to Grafton, and there I had an interview 
with both of them. I called their attention to 
the false stateraen's which bad appeared in 
the newspapers in relation to my efforts to 
intercept or capture Garnett's army; stated 
tl^t my report was not prepared, as reports 
frDm my subordinates were not in— but that 
it soon would \)e ready; and,, in view of the 
fact that everything had transpired whi'.eMaj. 
Gen. McClellan was in command, stated that 
I should expect and desire him to take every 
step necessary to vindicate himself and the 
service, and to enable him to do so (he more 
promptly and conveniently ; and at the same 
time to enable his successor, Gen. Rosecrans, 
*.o act, I asked permission of both them to 
make my report, in duplicate, addressing one 
«opy to Maj. Gen. McClellan and one copy to 
Brig. Gen. Rosecrans, and also asked prompt 
action by them upon anything found to be 
wrong. And I especially asked of Ms.j. Gen. 
McClellan that he would make an early inves- 
tigation of the case, so ftyi as there were facts 
that he might wisli to inquire into, and tliat h-e, 
would promptly give his conclusions to the public. 
This he promised to do so soon as he should re- 
mve my Report. Within ten days after that 
interview my Report was completed in dupli- 
•ate and one copy, with a map and the re- 
ports of my subordinates, addressed and 
forwarded to Major General McClellan and 
ihe other to Brigadier General Rosecrans. — 
From tliG circumstances of the case, it 
was understood and expected that G ne- ' 
eral Rosecrans would defer to Gen. McClel- 
lan. But on looking the case over he did not 
kesitate, in a con vernation with ray Cliief of 



Stair, now Brig. Gen. J. W. Fuilei, :„ .......;- 

ate me from all blame. 

I trusted to the promixe of Gen. McClellan 
to promptly exandne and viiulicate the truth, 
and knew, that in so doing, as a man of intel- 
ligence and honor, he could <lo no less than 
to exonerate me fully. But months wi'nt by 
after he received my Rui or^., and no e.\-pres- 
sion was obtained I'r.im him. Afnr so much 
delay, I deemed myself entitled to be heard 
by the public and accordingly gave out my 
Report and the Reports of my subordinates 
tor fihblication, and the whole appeared in 
Pait T. of the Companion to the Rebellion 
Record in the Spring of 1862. 

I continued to watch anxiously and to i:> 
quire for «ny comment or report from Gener- 
al McClellan, touching my transactions in 
Virginia, but .got no intelligence of anything 
from him until ihe IGtli of last month, when 
I heard of the publication, by Sheldon i.c Co., 
of a book written by Misjor General McClel- 
lan, containing "An account of the campaign 
in Western Virfiuia." I obtained the book 
on the 17ih ultimo, and found in it a preface 
dated February 22d, 1864, in which the au- 
thor denominates his account of his Western 
Virginia Campaign a " Simple Narrative.'" 
It is in no sense an official report. So iar as 
it is intended to etlect me, it is a practical ad- 
mission by the author, after surveying the field 
of his necessities, for nearly three years, that 
he must have a scape-goat, or the miraculously 
inflated repulatifui which the newspripers 
made for him out of his Western Virginia 
campaign must collapse. I c cline the honor 
of serving as his scape-goat, and now, at the 
earliest moment which I could command for 
such a purpose, will show with how much 
regard for truth, and wiih how much freedom 
from a depraved ambi'ion, and a mean, sel- 
fish spirit, the writer of the narrative has sta- 
ted his facts and drawn his conclusions. 

He has been relieved from official duty ever 
since the 7ih of November, 1862, and if he 
had not time before, he certainly has bad time 
enough since, to \odk about and know whereof 
he affirms, before making disparaging allu- 
sions to another. He Jiud had my report and 
accompanying documents iwo years and half 
before his narrative was written, and now I 
propose to test his statements by known facts, 
and by the original papers, which I happen 
to have preserved, and still hold. 

He asserts in two places that "if the Rebel 
army were cut off from a retreat via Huttons- 
ville, their o?ily chance for ehcape would be 
via Leedsville, and St. George, or by forcing 
the passage of the Cheat River near Rowles- 
bure." Their retreat by way of Huttonsville 
was cut otf; and the Rebel army, in escipiug, 
did not follow the Cheat River" to St. George, 
nor go within five miles of that place, nor 
within twenty miles of Rowlesburg. I admit, 
that in taking the shortest and most direct 
route to the East, the Rebels were disrespect- 
ful to " the Commanding General of the 
Department of the Ohio ;" but they saved 
about thirty miles of travel by it, and with 
his plans, and mode and time of execution, 
they were saved the possibility of serious tnter- 
rnpMon in their escape. 

He put then, and still puts, great stress up- 
on Rowlesburg and the Cheat River line, not- 
withstanding the fact which I reported to 
him about »he Ist day of July, 1861, that the 
reconnoissance by Col. Whittlesey and^Jaji^r 
Frothingham, Engineers, showed fllat Oalv 



land should be Uie basr-t, and Chisholm's Mill 
two miles from i he Red-House, the position 
to be held ou the North- west turn- pike ; but 
he did not respond. He ^I5^|j|^directed me 
to hold myself in n-adiness tosfWigthen the 
Cheat River line. His instructions, commu- i 
nicafced by his Adjutant-General were as fbl- | 
lows: "The commanding General instructs i 
me to add, that he has entrusted to you the ■ 
most important duty next to his own in this | 
Teriitory, viz, that of securing the the ba^e of I 
7m operationfi and line of , retreat. At any cost j 
— that of your last man — you will preserve the I 
Cheat River line, Grafton and the line thence j 
to WMeling. On this depends the entire sue- j 
ce?s of the plan of operations." Although 
repeatedly and continually stripped by Gen. I 
McClellau of disposable troops, I defy him to 1 
show one minute of lime when I fiiiled to do 
the doty thus required of me. 

Pretending to show my^resources, he allea;es 
that he gave me, among other troops, the 15ih 
and 16th Ohio regiments and Dahn's 
[Daum's] battery, before he left Grafton, (June 
28th); while the truth is, that before he as- 
signed me a command, he had detached three 
companies of the loth, and three or four com- 
panies cf the lij.h Ohio, and assigned them 
to Gen. Morris, who retained them through- 
out the campaign, and Daum's battery was 
not mastered — was not organized, nor iniised, 
and did not leave Wheeling until nearly two 
weeks later ;— and up to Uie escape of Gar- 
nett's army, July 14: h, with all the efforts 
that Captain Daum i-.nd I could make, not a 
horse, nor a harness could be obtained for 
that battery. It consit-ted of about one hun- 
dred good men, just recruited, and four guns, 
with limbers and caissons, in the hands of 
good otHcers; and that was all! It was for 
field service ! I had no other artillery. 

St. Ge'>rge, about eight miles below and 
South of Corrick's F"rd, (where Garnett's ar- 
my crossed the Cheat River,) was the farthest 
point from the railroad that Gi.-n. McCiellan 
at any time proposed to have my troops occu- 
py. In a letter, over his own signiture, dated 
July ;3d, 1861, he tells me to hold the 6th 
Ohio' to occupy that place, but I was not to 
move towards St. George without deiiuite in- 
structions. 

Sub«equenr!y,on the same day; he telegraph- 
ed me to send i.he 3th Ohio to Brig. Gen. Mor- 
ris at Phillippi, and conc.tudi-d, saying: "I 
shall hold myself ready to re-enforce you at 
all times, if necessary." I repeatedly asked 
for a disposable force so that I might extend 
my operatifms and be ready for emergencies, 
but to no avail. I was left as I had been, with 
scant garrisons for my two Railroads and oth- 
er lines, and not so much as one Regiiuent of 
disposable troops. 

In his dispatch to Col. E. D. Townsend, A. 
A. Gen., dated at Beverly, July 13ih, '61 (see 
1. Rebellion Record, p. 284), Gen. McCiellan 
says, (alluding to me), "The General is con- 
centrating alibis troops at Rowlesburg, and 
he will cut off Garnett's retreat near West Un- 
ion, or, if possible, at St. George." Thus, by 
inference, he officially represented to the War 
Department, and to the whole Country, that 
he h d given me my orders and placed troops 
and means in my hands, so many days before, 
. that then, on the 12th of July, I was in the very 
path of the Rebels, and was sure to cut them 
off, when he well knew that I had neither re- 
ceived orders or troops for that movement. — 
He putni&ly represented me as doing what I 



was not doing, and what I had not means or 
authoiity to do. The assurances in his dis- 
patch were not, and could not be fulfilled. — 
The War Department and the Public were 
disappointed. The tault was his, but by long 
silence, when he ought to have spoktn, and 
misrepreseiitation in much that he has spoken, 
he has used his high posiuon to cast the blame 
upon me. Thanks that he has at last written 
his '"narrative" at^d taken a tangible position. 
On page 33 of the "narrative" its author 
sayf — " During the evening of the 12lh I in- 
formed Gen. Hiil * * * that Oarnett was 
moviiug towards Eastern Yirginin, * * * 
and directed him to take the field at once," <fec. 
If he informed me on the evening of the 12th, 
then I mitsthave received the information and 
his order at that time, and in that case I must 
have had, say 14 hours more time than I have 
stated in my Report. I say there that Gen. 
McClellan's telegram is dated at Beverly, July 
12th, and at Roaring Run, July 13th, and that 
it did not reach me at Grafton until 11 A. M. 
of the 13th. I have now tliat teUgrara in my 
possession and I can prove the facts just as I 
allege them by a dozen unimpeachable wit- 
nesses, including two Brigadier Generals, one 
Colonel and two Lieut. Cc)lonels, now in the 
service, and the contrary can't be proven by 
any one. It is unqualifiedly false. 

In the same paragraph he speaks of order- 
ing Col. Cuas. J. Biddle, with two Pennsyl- 
vania Regiments, from Cumberland to report 
to me at Rowlesbuig, (which is 23 miles west 
ol Oakland), and then says that he ordered me 
to gather up my Railroad Guards towards 
Wheeling and Parkersburg and concentrate 
them at Rowlesiburg, or Oaklands. The "or 
Oaklands," part of ttiis paragraph is destitute 
of a shadow of truth. And why "or Oak- 
lands ? " If Rowlesburg was the right place, 
Oakland was rtot, aud vixe tersa. He orderes 
the two Pennsylvania Rigiments fn^m the 
East to pass on We^t by Oakland and report 
to me at Rowlesburg, 21 miles from the Red 
House, instead of leaving me to say where I 
wanted them. I could not see the advantage 
of Rowlesburg with its 21 miles hard march 
for our troops, nearly all destitute of wagon 
transportation and, therefore, went on to Oak- 
land, reducing the line of march and wagon 
transportation 10 or 12 miles in the operation. 
The author of the ''narraliee" says on page 
33—" Ou the 13th Gen. Hill started with some 
2,500 men, followed by considerable support, 
which were [when?] rapidly arriving by rail, 
[where ?] and on the morning of the 14ih ar- 
rived at a point beyond the Red House, one 
and a half miles from the remnants of Gar- 
nett's army, who, starved, exhausted and dis- 
organized, were seeking a little rest, before 
continuing their rapid retreat. For some rea- 
son, which I have never yet understood, and 
which the pressure of more important cares 
soon prevented me from following up, he here 
abandoned the pursuit, and ordered a retro- 
grade when the game was apparently within 
his grasp." 

It ought not to excite wonder that it should 
take the author of this ' simple narrative" two 
years and a half to gather up so much disin- 
genuousness and stuff so much untruth into 
one paragraph, as is contained in the one here 
quoted. 

The truth is just this. I Jiad sent trains on 
both roads west from Grafton to gather up 
troops : had given all necessary orders, and 
then I started for Oakland, in the first train 



•'• A. 



fVr>'-Ti!9"» 



with only four coiipiiuits of infantry, (aU that 

I could get ready) follovied that evening with 
only very iuconsicjeiuble supports, very slowly 
arriving. Onlj- iwo light trains, including 
my own, had reached Oakland when I Itrt 
there at 9 A. M., on the 14th, bringing in all, 
probably not over 700 men. My troops were 
scattered along nearly two hundred miles 
of rail-road, wett of Grafton, and wire 
to be picked up, a few men in a place, 
with the necessary supplies. It und< r 
such circumstances, getting .my orders only at 

II A. M. that day, on the same day, I gathered 
up and started off with 2,500 men, and so pro- 
vided that considerable supports ^cere rapidly 
arrivirig hy rail, then I obeyed orders more 
promptly and moreefflciently than the author 
of this "narrative" ever did, and he ought to 
liave resigned in my favor. I confess to hav- 
ing exerted myself to the utmost, from the 
beginning to the erd, but I accomplished no 
such thing as he alleges. 

This same author is full of apologies and 
sweet excuses for Gen. Morris, who had been 
out in front of the enemy at Laurel Hill for 
some two weeks, with his troops well in hand, 
watching for a chance at the Rebels. He says 
of Gen. Morris' purbuit : "The usual difficulty 
and delay in getting new troops started on the 
march, &c., gave the enemy still further ad- 
vantages," «fec. Were not my troops just as 
new And far less used to preparations for, and 
the making of actual movements ? And the 
"rapidly arriving by rail !"' Why, it was uni- 
versally notorious that by the management 
and bad faith of many of the employees on 
that Railroad, in that very movement, trains 
were unaccountably delayed. Appreciating 
the importance of the greatest possible dis- 
patch, I had placed two members of my Staff 
at Grafton to hurry forward the trains with 
troops and supplies. And after I reachea 
Oakland where I could do most to facilitate 
organization and movements, I telegraphed 
repeatedly to Col. Fuller (now Brig. Gen.) at 
Grafton, inquiring about trains, and com- 
plaing of delays. In one of his replies, allud- 
ing to the delays, he says: "There is some- 
thing wrong in this road, you may depend. 
If you say the word I'll arrest a few of the 
managers and run the road myself." 

Three companies only of the first two trains 
were able to leave Oakland before I did, and 
I left there at 9 A. M. on the 14th. I stopped 
at the Red House, a few minutes, to make in- 
quiries and necessary dispositions, and then 
hastened on to*the point where I overtook our 
infantry, who, under command of Colonel 
Irvine, 16th Ohio, with about 1,200 men (in- 
cluding the three companies sent over 
from Oakland the night before,) had made a 
forced march of fourteen miles, from West 
Union, (all without breakfast, and several 
companies without having had any supper the 
night before,) in pursuit of the Rebel army. I 
had traveled, after leaving Oakland, all of six- 
teen miles, and it must have been full 11 A. M. 
when I overtook our infantry. They were 
resting, and practically the pursuit was ended 
before I came up. A conference was at once 
held to gather facts as to the condition of the 
command. Mounted officers and detachment 
of cavalry, sent out by Col. Irvine, returned 
from a reconnoissance to the front and report- 
ed to him. His report and those of Col. De 
Puy, Capt. Keyes and Adj't Marshall are all 
published with my report, and show that our 
infantry could not at any time have been 



nearer than 8 miles of the Rebel army. They 
started one hour behind in time aiA S miles 
behind in distance, and being ai.out as hungry 
as the rebels were at the worst, did well to 
gain three miles in fourteen. The author of 
the '^ narrntive did know why the pur&uit 
was abandoned. ily report and the 
accompanying documents show the facts 
and corclusious. There was not a Cap- 
tain, or any officer of higher grade who 
thought further pursuit practicable. The 
men could get no food in that countiy 
in the track of the rebel army. They had no 
transportation, and food could not be bn^ught 
to them, and they must go back where sup- 
plies could be reached, or they too, would be 
"starved, exhausted and disorganized." 

All of the fine rhetoric of this pathetic "«/z»*- 
ratite" about the remnants of Garnett's army 
" who, starved, exhausted and disorganized, 
were seeking a little rest " &c., is the work of 
a convenient, and very willing invagina- 
tion. That same army only stopped for din- 
ner after crossing the n^rth branch of the Po- 
tomac, Difficult Creek and tStony River, and 
then went on and encamped on the night of 
that same 14th of July, beyond the Gap »t 
Greenland, more than 30 miles beyond the 
point where our infantry halted and turned 
back, and within that space this same Rebel 
army, that day, burned two important bridges. 
It may be useful to stop right here and in- 
quire about the strength, discipline, and effi- 
ciency of this Rebel army. In his dispatch to 
Col. E. '.Townsenrl, A. A. General, dated 
July 12th, '61, and already referred to, the au- 
thor of the " narrative " puts the strength of 
Garnett's army at 10,000 men, and two days 
later he tells that officer—" The troops that 
Garnett had under his command were said to 
be the crack regiments of Eastern Virginia, 
aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and North 
Carolinians. " On page 34 of the " narrative " 
the writer assumes that the Rebel killed, 
wounded and prisoners, during the campaign 
amounted to 1,000, and on the same page, 
that their available strength was 8,000. Now 
what became of the other 7,000 or 9,000, who 
were not killed, w^ounded or made prisoners ? 
There were enough of them in their rear 
guard, and m sufficient condition to shake off 
the army of Gen. Morris at Corrick's Fora. at 
which point his pursuit ended. 

In going to intercept those 9,000 or 7,000 
"crack troops" who had eluded and escaped 
Generals ISIcClellan and Morris, I was order- 
ed to take 6,000 men and the same four guns, 
(without a horse, or a harness.) I was about 
as bad off for wagon transportation as 
for artillery horses and harnes-s. Just eighteen 
hours and»«(? ?nore, elapsed between the time 
ot mv receiving Gen. McClellan's order to 
gather up my Railroad Guards and the march- 
ing of the rear guard of the reliel army past 
the Red House, 21 miles march from Rowles- 
burtr. 

What it was possible for me to do in tha^ 
period of 18 hours, was done, and I defy any 
o^.e to show that more could have been done 
under the circumstances. 

The motive and purpose of the "narrative" 
will be easily gathered by putting a few of its 
facts together. The author, with three Brig- 
ades, including the 8th, 10th, 13th, 14th and 
15th Indiana, and 3d, 4th, 7th, 9th and 10th 
Regiments of Ohio Infantry and eight com- 
panies additional, including Cavalry, Artillery 
and Riflemen, held the lelt flank and rear of 



4 



) 



Garuett's army. . The Cheat SWil||||^s shut 
then\ in on their right flanV;, and G^^llorris 
aciing under the direct command of Geu. Mc- 
Clellan lay in front of the rebels with the 6ih 
and 14th Ohio, and the 0th, 7th and 9th Indi- 
ana Regiments and 11 additional companies. 
Here was a force equal to 18 or 19 regiments ; 
and regiments in those days were generally 
maximum. Nearly two weeks were spent in 
taking positions, and after all from 7,000 to 
9,000 of the rebels escaped from " the Major- 
Qeneral comniandiug," notwithstanding his 
force was nearly or quite double the rebels in 
number. Of course the rebels must have been 
very choice troojis to escape ?m grasp ! Surely 
they were "crack regimenU!" until their rear 
guard bade good bye to Gen. Morris at Cor- 
rick's Ford ! The author of the "narrative" 
miast shirk the responsibility of this escape. — 
Pie had failed to give me troops, or time to 
place '.hem in position, and so he kindly and 
thoroughly compensates for the whole. He 
turns magician, and with his pen for a wand, 
at once, somewhere bttweeu Corrick's Ford 
and the Red House, reduces that fine army of 
rebels to a few " ■?w«;ianfe," ^'v^ho, starved, ex- 
hausted and disorganized, were seeking a little 
r&st ! " &c. Thus four important objects were 
accomplished : 1st. The rebels were well 
punished for presuming to escape. 

3d. A patriotic ■^'ork was done for the coun- 
try. 

3d. It was made practicable forme, without 
reference to time, space, or circumstances, to 
intercept, pursue and capture the rebels with 
i 'its one re|^*iment, provided always that or- 
ders were given in French just as ihey would 
have been by the Great Napoleon ; and 

4t.hly, And most important of all, no re- 
sponsibility would remain on the shoulders of 
"the Major-General commanding." 

On the 33d page of the "narrative" it is said, 
in giving the results of the affiiir at Corrick's 
Ford, that all. of the enemy's guns were cap- 
tured, or soon abandoned. Such is not the 
fact. I had it directly from citizens who saw 
the rehel array pass the Red House and on the 
road beyond there, that theie were from three 
to five pieces of Artillery in the column, and 
the tracks in the road showed conclusively 
that the rear of the column was coveied by 
Artillery until they crossed the north biauch 
of the Potomac. 

On the 34th page of the " Narrative " my 
eipadiiion from Oakland, on the 15t.h, after 
my troops and supplies had mostly come up, 
is censured, because, as the "narrative" says, 
it was "not within the spirit of my instruc- 
tions, which were to cut off the enemy's re- 
treiit," and so he ordered me to return. I will 
neither consume time, or space with repeat- 
ing the facts 1 had gathered, or niy plan of 
'jperations, but reter to my report for both ; 
])nt I have something to say about the order. 
Mark the date. It was July 14t,h. It was 
from Huttonsviile. It did not leach me at 
Oakland until noon, or after, of the 15th, and 
it could not have been expected to reach me 
earlier than that. It says: "I charge you to 
complete your operations by the capture of 
the remamder of his [Garnett's] force. If you 
have but one regiment attack and check them 
until the others arrive. You may never havet? 
such another opportunity again. Do. not 
throw it away. Conduct the movement in 
person and follow them ! a Vouirance!''' 
(io tJie uttermost.) I was obeying this order 



before I knew of its existence, and had only 
to go on just as I was inteiii cling to do. And 
with this order in my hands, its author pre- 
sumes to censure me for my march of 35^^ 
miles, over all the ranges of the Alleghenies, 
in twenty four hours, in pursuit of the rebel 
army. 

The notice of the approach of Col. Mor- 
ton's codnimn from New Creek, carried to the 
rebel army from the top of New Creek Moun- 
taiufi, induced them to move from Greeidand 
in the afternoon of the 16th. Otherwise we 
must have met them that night or the next 
morning. 

1 beg to correct another error in fact. He 
says in his telegram to me, dated the 13th, at 
Beveil\', and the 13th, at Roaring Run, al- 
ready referred to. "Two Pennsylvania regi- 
ments at Cumberla,nd have been directed to 
proceed forthwith to Rowlesburg by special 
trains and report to you." It was not true. 
The telegrapiiic order for those regiments was 
dated the 13th, one day. after the date of my 
order in which the "have bren" occurred, and 
I am confident it was not transmitted over the 
wires until after I had left Grafton at 4 P. M., 
of the 13lh. 

During the period in question there were 
large numbers of rebels and rebel sympathiz- 
ers in most parts of Westrcn Virginia, and it 
is absurd to suppose that they did not keep 
Gen. Garnettand his successor advised of the 
state of our railroad lines and of the condition 
and strength of the garrisons on and near 
them. As should have been anticipated, Gar- 
nett knew that I had no adequate disposable 
force to meet him. The Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad between Rowlesburg and Cumber- 
land was not garrisoned, or protected. Gen. 
McClellan had it in contemplation to re-in- 
force me from Cumberland. He was antici- 
pated by the rebels, who, on the 18th of July, 
just in the nick of time, destroyed railroad and 
telegraphic communication between my Dis- 
trict and Cumberjand. And thus, as in other 
cases, the plans of the Major General, which 
might have worked well enough, if sequred in 
their details and put in operation at the pro- 
per time, and with sufficient vigor, were bar- 
ren of good results. The same characteristic 
deficiency was manifested in delay mg my or- 
ders so that they were impossible of execution, 
and fur all this, the writer of the "narrative" 
is alone at fault. 

A few words about the length of this paper. 
I am sufficiently .sensibie of the difference in 
recent and present position between Gen. Mc- 
Clellan and myself. Having paved the way 
by directly or indirectly countenancing and 
giving color to false newspaper reports, which 
originated chiefly at his headquarters, at 
the end of two years and a half he takes to 
book-making for his own purposes, and pub- 
licly becomes my accuser. Not, as an hon- 
orable man, or officer of high rank, of abun- 
dant leisure, and enjoying large compensaiion 
from the Government, should have done, 
by bringing the case before a proper tribunal 
for inv"Stigation; but in a manner at once ir- 
regular, unofflcer like, and disreputable to 
the service. He could trust to his position to 
give weight to his statements. My denial 
must be accompanied with proofs, and I now 
submit them to the consideration of any can- 
did reader. 

CiTAS. W. Hill. 



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